Por Marc Dourojeanni

In the rapid occupation process of the Peruvian jungle, characterized in the last decades by road infrastructure, petroleum and mining exploitation in addition to usual agriculture, cattle ranching and forestry activities, another determining element has arisen.  It is the exploitation of hydroelectric potential.  Presidents Alan García from Peru and Luis Ignacio
Lula da Silva from Brazil formally launched, on April 28th 2009, the race that will culminate with the operation of an undetermined number of grand dams in the high jungle rivers of Peru that are mainly aiming at supplying the insatiable energy demand of the neighboring country.

News of the signing of a memorandum of intent between Brazil and Peru, where amongst its six points has one referring to hydroelectric possible plants was commented with far more detail in Brazil than in Peru where it was done almost without anyone noticing despite its very serious geopolitical, economic, social and environmental importance.  In essence, the memorandum proposes allowing Brazil to study, finance, build and operate up to six very large hydroelectric power plants on Peruvian soil to supply its energy requirements, purchasing a large part of the energy produced in Peru.  The hydroelectric plants chosen by Brazil are Inambari (2,000 MW), Sumabeni (1,074 MW), Paquitzapango (2,000 MW), Urubamba (940 MW), Vizcatan (750 MW) and Chuquipampa (800 MW) and, of course, the corresponding transmission lines which will be integrated into the Brazilian system. 

The total cost of these six undertakings will amount to the order of US$ 16 billion dollars and the first project selected is on the Inambari River, at the confluence of Madre de Dios, Cuzco and Puno departments at a cost of US$ 4 billion dollars.  Only to give an idea of what it entails Inambari would, in terms of generation of energy, be the largest dam in Peru and the fifth largest in Latin America flooding an area of over 46,000 hectares.

On revising the information one discovers that the actions to be taken in order to carry out this project were being implemented long before the signature of the memorandum.  According to the media, two new companies are already working in Peru, the Empresa de Generacion Electica Amazonas Sur SAC, made up mainly of Engevix, the main consulting firm in Brazil and Inambari Geracao de Energia, a consortium made up by Brazilian state-owned Eletrobras and Furnas and the construction company OAS, also Brazilian. 

They apparently already have a credit of US$ 2,5 billion from the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimiento Economico e Social (BNDES).  The studies, carried out by the first of the mentioned corporations are already being carried out by the equally Brazilian company PSR Consultant and sub-contractor, according to a ministerial resolution of Energy and Mines given in June 2008, in other words a year before the presidential meeting.  It could be true that this was not a “state secret” but it also undeniable that the government made no effort to divulge this important event affecting the nation’s future.  In fact, the six dam projects are not new. 

They were already proposed in the 70s based on a study made by a specialized company (Lahmeyer-Salzgitter) with financing by the German government (GTZ) and the World Bank. In this regard, numerous possibilities were detected of the 14, which are priorities.  Brazilians chose 6 of these, which were most convenient.

At this point without major information, it is difficult to evaluate whether the undergoing negotiations for Brazil to develop and exploit Inambari and the other dams will represent a benefit for Peru.  What is evident is that the construction of large dams on the Amazon rivers will have enormous economic repercussions in terms of external debt and obviously, extreme environmental and social impacts. 

There is countless information on those impacts especially on Brazilian Amazon conditions and, truly, they require reflection long before they embark on construction of them.  Their direct impacts include the important displacement of humans, economic changes and social not always positive, flooding of scarce fertile land, deforestation, elimination of fauna, alteration of the hydro biologic system and of neighboring land ecosystems, especially problems of contamination (generation of methane), etc.  The indirect ones are worse and they extend over enormous surfaces that include invasion of protected areas and Indian territories, more deforestation since the work will attract more people and energy facilitates new speculations.  All of these problems will be even more serious in the sui generis conditions of the high jungle, since the valleys are narrow and their biota elements are rare and many are endemic.

The corporations involved have already announced some of the results of the environmental impact study of Inambari.  It, predictably, says in essence, “that there is no problem” and if there were any, they are easily resolved.  This is highly unlikely when we already know, for example, that the reservoir will flood all the existing agriculture in the area, as well as the illegal gold mining and various populated centers which, also, due to the characteristics of the valley, will be unable to be reallocated appropriately. 

We also know that it will flood between 90 km and 150 km (depending on the final altitude of the dam) of the recently built Interoceanica highway whose cost is very high and paid by Peruvians.  The abrupt slopes of the region are not stable and can affect the reservoir. Worst of all is that it will also flood part of the buffer zone of the Bahuaja-Sonene Park and that, in order to rebuild the road, this will be very close to the Park itself gravely threatening its future. We already know, through studies in the same Basin, that many of the fish species including some rare ones will be drastically affected.

The impact of the other dams could be greater or smaller of than that of Inambari, but they will not be spared and even worse their effect will be accumulative.  In Brazil, for example, the dams have left a large part of the country without rivers to be exploited with one or more construction works for energy purposes, with most serious and documented social and environmental implications.  They have generated, for example, the important popular movement called Movimento dos Afetados pelas Barragens (MAB) that calls for a fair treatment of the victims of these construction works and in order for it to be acknowledged invades and occupies installations of the corporations.

The problem then is most important and before starting the work, as seems to be the case, must be discussed on a national level and not only exposed in a short manner at a local level in small meetings of misinformed farmers where the supposed benefits at emphasized and the problems are swindled.  The questions Peruvian promoters of the works must reply to be basically three:
1.Which is the present sate of the negotiation or the present level of Peru’s commitment with corporations, and the Brazilian government in the case of Inambari and of the other projects? Is there still a possibility to discuss the subject or to find other alternatives?

2.To what extent the advancement of the feasibility studies of Inambari, without pre- feasibility studies, including social and environmental aspects, does not show that the construction work already decided, compromising the option of not carrying out the work if its impacts are excessive, as the environmental legislation indicates?

3.Which will be the benefits for Peru of a hydroelectric program which, as informed, will be studied, financed, constructed and operated by the neighboring country who will buy the vast majority of the production?  Do they not imagine the risk that entail waiting for the hydroelectric power plants to be returned to Peru already sedimented and obsolete despite the fact that Peru must continue paying the gigantic loan embarked on?

Brazil and Paraguay are precisely now confronting a difficult situation with regard to Itaipu that was constructed in similar conditions to those proposed now for the six Peruvian dams.  The Brazilian argument is that the bi-national agreement signed in 1973 backs their attitude to not pay any more for the energy bought.  But the Paraguayan argument is that they cannot even pay the debt taken on for the construction because Brazil pays a vile price for the energy that they buy under exclusivity.  It does not matter, in this case, who is right, but Peru should study deeply this conflict before embarking on similar long-term international agreements.

It is perfectly reasonable that Peru sells energy that it does not need to neighbor countries like Brazil, like any country does with this or any other resource.  That is normal, desirable and is part of continental integration.  However before taking a decision, economic, social and environmental studies must be carried out which guarantee that the benefits will be greater than the damages, in other words that it be profitable under those three terms. 

The economic benefits must ensure, also, a minimum of social and environmental damage or adequate compensation.  What is more, in this case a strategic socio-environmental assessment must be made of the total hydroelectric program of the Amazon region must be addressed, not only of Inambari.  One thing is “a dam” in the high jungle and another very different one are 6 to 14 hydroelectric power plans on the main national rivers. 

Likewise, on reading the Lahmeyer-Salzgitter study it reveals that, only in Inambari, there could be five more dams to “exploit” the best potential.  Each river in the Amazon could, in effect, be converted into a succession of artificial lakes, as is the case already on several Brazilian rivers. The new Environment Minister of Peru must undertake an independent assessment on this problem and to insist that financial resources to do this task be allocated.

On the other hand, it is difficult to understand why the Peruvian government, that is presently confronting a serious social conflict in the Amazon region, precisely due to lack of information and discussion of their activities, once again reverts to adopting the same behavior as for the hydroelectric power plants that are projected.  The only way to legitimize this program is divulging and discussing it seriously at national, regional and local levels and at the political, academic and popular levels.  We hope that the very sad experience of the Interoceanica highway, which will be partially destroyed by the Inambari dam, which was based on poor quality socio-environmental assessments and useless, since the road was already being built when these were finalized.